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D. T. Suzuki’s two posthumous volumes on Shin Buddhism—his Collected 
Writings on Shin Buddhism and translation of The Kydgydshiruhd* 1—have “opened 
yet one more treasury of Buddhism to the Western world,” as Nishitani Kciji 
rightly observes.2 Alfred Bloom has already reviewed the set for this journal,3 
and qua review his statement needs no supplement. My object is different: 
to look, not so much at these books as through them into man’s religious 
consciousness generally, for the books have helped me see things about that 
consciousness I had not heretofore noticed—not, at least, as clearly. If the view 
I report proves helpful to others, Dr. Suzuki will have helped to open to the 
world another treasury not just of Buddhism but of the human spirit.
* I am indebted to Louis Nordstrom and Richard Pilgrim, my colleagues, for reading 
this essay in the course of its preparation and for their helpful comments. Neither, of 
course, is responsible for what remains.
1 Kyoto: Shinshu Otani-ha, 1973.
3 Foreword to 77ie fyogyoshinsho. Professor Nishitani served as supervising editor of 
the impressive project that brought these sumptuous volumes to print, a project that 
required seven years and a considerable staff of whom Emyd ltd and Mihoko Okamura 
deserve special mention.
3 Vol. vni, no. 2 (October, 1975), pp. 163-69.
In the West Daisetz Suzuki will probably always be remembered as the man 
who singlehandedly, it almost seemed, brought Zen Buddhism to America, this 
being the side of himself which, in the English writings that appeared in his 
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lifetime, he turned in our direction. But his Japanese Spirituality*  which he wrote 
for his own people joins the two volumes here in focus to show that his full 
concern was in fact polar. While he was interpreting Zen to the West he was 
quietly sounding, deeper and yet more deeply, the Pure Land schools of Hfinen 
and especially Shinran who “took Pure Land Buddhism to its highest point” 
(Nishitani, p. ix).s But more. It was not just that he was determined to neglect 
neither of these superlative expressions of the Japanese spirit. He wanted to 
fathom their relation. Professor Bloom puts the point precisely when he writes: 
“Through all his work, Dr. Suzuki’s purpose in expounding both Zen and Shin 
Buddhism was to show the essential oneness of Mahayana Buddhism” (op. eit.t 
p. 164).
* English translation by Norman Waddell. Japanese National Commission for 
UNESCO, I972.
5 Those who knew Dr. Suzuki only through his Zen writings will be surprised to find 
that as early as 1949 he had written: “Of all the developments MahAyina Buddhism 
has achieved in the Far East, the most remarkable one is, according to my judgment, 
the Shin teaching of the Pure Land school” (Collttted Writings on Shin Buddhism, p. 36, 
hereafter designated as CPF).
There Dr. Suzuki’s interest in convergence stopped; when he alluded to 
other traditions, chiefly Hlnayina Buddhism and Christianity, it was usually 
to show how they differed from Mahayana. For my part I wish to suggest 
that the convergence Dr. Suzuki so perceptively spotted in Mahayana Buddhism 
can serve as paradigm for tempering four controversies that have dogged theo­
logy in general:
I. Is God personal or transpersonal ?
II. Is he without (transcendent) or within (immanent) ?
III. Is he substance or process?
IV. Is he realized by grace or self-effort ?
That says abstractly what I want to do, but my project will be more graphic 
if I link it to a concrete image, and one is at hand. This essay, as it happens, is 
being written on an ocean voyage. Considering its subject it is appropriate that 
the passage is from Japan to America, but the immediate point is another one. 
When I boarded this ship in Kobe my thesis was at best hazy, but I came upon 
an item that brought it to sharp relief: a freak of navigation that was recounted 
in the “Welcome Aboard” folio that greeted my wife and me as we entered our 
cabin.
It seems that at the exact turn of the last century—Daisetz Suzuki would 
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then have been a young man nearing thirty—an Australian passenger steamer, 
the Warn'moo, found itself in interesting waters. Recognizing that fact its captain 
managed with a bit of maneuvering to set his ship precisely astride the intersec­
tion of the Equator and the International Date Line. The consequences of this 
bizarre position were interesting. The date in the forepart of the ship was 
January i, 1900; in the stern it was December 30, 1899. Passengers in the front 
were in the southern hemisphere in the middle of summer, while those behind 
were in the northern hemisphere in the middle of winter. Thus the passengers 
were not only in two different hemispheres, two different days, two different 
months, two different seasons, and two different years, but in two different cen­
turies. Yet the differences were experienced simultaneously and on the same ship.
The moral for my thesis is obvious. However different the theological alter­
natives I listed above may seem—and in ways are—those who are divided by 
them are on the same ship; in the same boat, we might say. The differences are 
negotiables in the sense that it is possible for passengers at either end of the ark 
to understand and respect the alternative positions even if they are not their 
own. In pursuing this claim I shall, as I have said, be using Dr. Suzuki’s 
posthumous volumes as my map, and their author as my guide.
I. Are We Saved by Self-Effort or Grace?
In introducing the four theological alternatives I listed this one last because 
unlike the others it focuses not on God himself but on man's approach to him. 
In examining the “negotiables” through Dr. Suzuki’s eyes, however, it should 
head the list, for it is the one he treats most explicitly.
Is man saved through grace or works? Every religion runs up against this 
question; all agree that both are necessary;6 and all contain strands that veer 
toward one side or the other—the way of the monkey whose young must cling 
to their mother’s neck, or the way of the cat whose kittens simply dangle from 
their mother’s mouth. But Buddhism is especially interesting on this point 
because its strands are so clearly divided. The Buddha appears to have allowed 
no room for grace, while the largest surviving sects of his followers—Pure Land 
(J., J6do) Buddhism and especially Shin—seems to allow for nothing else. T. I.
• "The winds of God’s grace are always blowing, but you must lift your sail” 
(Vivekinanda). I once heard a New Testament scholar epitomize St. Paul’s theology in 
language that can be excused because it makes its point vividly: "You have to work like 
hell because it’s all been done for you.”
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Stcherbatsky’s account of the transformation has become classic:
When we sec an atheistic, soul-denying, philosophic teaching of a 
path to personal final deliverance, consisting in an absolute extinction 
of life and a simple worship of the memory of its human founder— 
when we see it superseded by a magnificent High Church with a su­
preme God, surrounded by a numerous pantheon and a host of saints, 
a religion highly devotional, highly ceremonious and clerical, with an 
ideal of universal salvation of all living creatures, a salvation not in 
annihilation but in eternal life—we are fully justified in maintaining 
that the history of religions has scarcely witnessed such a break between 
new and old within the pale of what nevertheless continues to claim 
common descent from the same religious founder.7
Dr. Suzuki acknowledges the change: “There is no doubt that... in the 
beginning there were no indications in the teaching of the master which 
betrayed the ‘other-power’ (iarikt) elements of later Buddhism" (CW, 15). 
His originality consists in arguing more systematically than anyone else I know 
that “the two systems apparently contradicting each other [are] really working 
in unison" (CIV, 12).
The grounds for his arguments are both historical and logical. Beginning 
with history, he grants that “we have no mention of. . . the idea of prapidhAna*  
... in Pali literature" (CIV, 17); even so, he argues,9 the founders of the Pure 
Land school were quite right in believing “that everything they had in the way 
of ‘tariki*  faith came from the teaching of Sakyamuni himself* ’ (CIV, 10). 
The reason is that the teachings of a founder cannot be limited to his words. 
“There is no doubt that Buddha was a wonderful personality: there must have 
been something in him which was superhuman, impressing his immediate 
disciples with a supematurally overwhelming and entirely irresistible power" 
(CW, 38), and central to this power was his example.10 Resisting the tempta-
7 The Conception of Buddhift Nirvana (Leningrad: Bulletin of the Academy of Sciences, 
U.S.S.R., 1927), p. 36.
• Literally vow, but by extension Amida's vow not to enter enlightenment until all 
beings are saved, and by further extension the concept of the transfer of merit (parinam&na").
9 In the etymological sense of argutre: to clarify, or literally, “make silver.”
10 In turning to Buddha's example rather than his words for the origin of the Pure 
Land emphasis, Dr. Suzuki is conceding that the basic Jddo sutias—The Larger Siira of 
Eternal Life, The Sutra of Meditation, and The Amido Sutra—cannot be ascribed to Gautama
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tion to proceed directly from his enlightenment into parinirvapa, he chose 
instead to devote forty-five arduous years to sharing with his followers the 
yield of his disciplined labor. However discontinuous this example may seem 
from his counsel to “be . . . lamps unto yourselves” and “work out your own 
salvation with diligence,” both the words and the example emanate from the 
same person and can be shown to be inseparable. Practically, his words could 
not have had a fraction of their impact had they not been backed by his 
example, while in principle his central teaching—anatta (no substantial soul) 
in its negative formulation;pratitya samutpdda (dependent co-origination) when 
expressed positively—precluded the possibility of an enlightenment that is self- 
contained. Enlightenment is not of the intellect only; it includes the will. And
according to Buddhist interpretation, the first thing the Will as 
embodied in an individual being wishes to achieve after . . . release is 
to do to others what it has done for itself. As enlightenment has made it 
known to the Will that there is no real and impassable gap between 
oneself and others, the Will feels now no need of asserting itself blindly, 
that is, following the dicutes of the principle of individuation. [On 
the contrary,] the efforts of an enlightened consciousness arc to lead 
others to the realisation of a similar sute of release (CW, 20).
If the Buddha did not spell all this out in so many words it must have been 
because of circumstance, not principle. He repeatedly stressed the need for 
upajra; knowledge must be shaped to the vessel that is to hold it. He also ex- 
himself. Their teachings are presented as coming from his lips, but that was only to insure 
their status.
Though this reading of the matter runs directly counter to Jfido’s claims, it is unchal­
lenged by modern historians of Buddhism. Enough of me sides with these historians to 
bar me from challenging their reading outright, but I do think we should continue to 
keep in mind that the later dale of the Pure Land texts does not close the door on the 
possibility of their having come from the Buddha’s lips. To the Hinaylnists*  citing of 
&akyamuni’s denial of any “dosed-fistedness in the Buddha”—Le., he held nothing back 
—Mah&yinists have always answered: “Granted, but did everyone understand all he 
taught?” Memories were good in those days and the Pili sutras are voluminous, but 
need we conclude that they comprise everything, even everything of importance, that 
the Buddha said? Why may we not believe with The Larger Sutra of Eternal Life that 
once on Vulture Peak Sikylmuni did indeed tell King Bimbisara’s despairing widow 
the story- true, whatever we think of the garbin which it was cast—of a certain Ami tabha 
Buddha whose merit availed to save even the conspirator-in-assassin that she had been ? 
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plicitly stated that the teachings he imparted were but a handful of leaves 
compared with those of the forest. If we accept Hi nay ana as primitive Bud­
dhism, MahAyina obviously follows it chronologically. But it also follows it in 
the sense of adhering to its trajectory. It discloses the foil, though partially 
unrecognized, implications of what was present at Buddhism’s start.
This is Dr. Suzuki’s historical argument for his claim that Shin’s stress on 
other-power is as genuinely Buddhist as Hinayana’s stress on self-power. 
Turning to logic, he argues the dialectical interdependence of self-power and 
other-power themselves.
Obviously there are times when only one of the two is in view: times when it 
seems that if anything is to come our way it must be through our own doing 
and other times when we simply sit back and ride the Glory Train—Shinran’s 
image is taking a boat ride; it is so easy and pleasant. But these are isolated 
episodes. No one can live durationally without alternation. Life is subject to 
rhythm: we wake and we sleep, we stretch our legs and relax. In the soul as in 
the world, things proceed in waves. And even without getting into time, if we 
look deeply into action and passion, giving and receiving, we find that each wi 
principle involves its opposite. The whole thrust of Jodo is from self-power to 
other-power, but to take effect this other-power must be received and this 
reception is itself a kind of doing.11 As the reception requires faith, indeed ab­
solute faith, it “is not . . . easy” (CPT, 117). It is not dolce far mmle—pleasant 
relaxation in carefree idleness; literally, sweet doing nothing. “There has to be 
a strong effort to obtain it. So in the end it may be as difficult as the efforts of 
Self-power sect believers” (ibid.). But quite apart from ratio, the point is that 
both components must figure to some degree. Even Shinran who carried other- 
power to its logical limit conceded that a supplicant had to pronounce the 
nembulsu at least once, and if we pick up the stick from its Zen end we find that 
it leads to the same middle. Zen stresses jiriki (self-power), but a clear giveaway 
shows this self-power to be planted in other-power soil.
*1 “Even a passivity which does nothing but receive has to have some active element” 
(D. T. Suzuki, Japanese Spirituality, p. 20). Or again: “A purely passive spiritual atten­
tion is quite impossible; there is always at least an incipient response on the part of man” 
(Hans Urs von Balthasar, Prayer, New York: Paulist Press, 1967, p. 98).
There is much bowing in Zen training [and] bowing the head isan age- 
old gesture of laying down ‘I*  ... in respect for something perceived 
as greater than ‘I*. ... In the training, so much depends on one’s own
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effort that there is an ever present danger of‘I’ getting a swollen head. 
Hence . . . bowing ... is indispensable.11 2
11 Irmgard Schloegl, 77iz Wisdom of the Zen Masters (New York: New Directions,
1976), p. 25.
13 “Amida’s will to help us out of the ocean of birth-and-death is no other than our 
faith in Amida. In Amida faith is the will to help and in us this will becomes faith; his 
will and our faith arc consubstantial as it were, hence a perfect correspondence between 
the two terms of Reality” (CW, 69).
14 “When my life opens up very dearly, I can’t help, from the depths of my heart, 
wanting to bow. When the mind that wants to bow to enemies and friends and demons 
and gods and evils and Buddhas and good friends and bad people—when this feeling 
comes tumbling out of my deep life, then I am already master of the whole world, I control 
the entire world, I become friends with all human and other beings” (Haya Akegarasu, 
Zen Notes, xxn, i January 1975, p. 3).
15 Sec his Studies m Zen (London: Rider & Co., 1955, 1957), pp. tig ff; The Eastern 
Buddhist New Series, vol. n, no. 1, p. 80; and Japanese Spirituality, p. 57.
There is one more step to be taken. Beginning at the most superficial level 
with (a) discrete experiences in which self- and other-power feel completely 
sealed from each other, we introduced time to show (b) that sequentially they 
must alternate. But having used time as an entr£, we stepped back and found it 
dispensable. Our initial atemporal reading was superficial and therefore one­
sided. Even without introducing time, (c) self- and other-power prove under 
inspection to entail each other in principle: other-power must be received, and 
self-power rides on a supportive context which the self did not create. The last 
step is taken when (d) each component is sensed to be its opposite.13 The Shin 
believer pronounces the nembulsu and yet he doesn’t: Ami da pronounces it 
using the believer’s lips while being simultaneously the faith/compassion that 
rises in the believer’s breast. The Zennist mirrors this gestalt. He discovers 
that he is the universe that supports his finite ego.
This may be the last step but it is not the last word, for partisans of either 
side can still claim that the/«/ of the two approaches are different: in Shin the 
self is nothing and Amida everything, whereas in Zen the self is it-Self every­
thing.14 15This is so; the difference is real, which is why there are two paths, 
not one. Dr. Suzuki never wished to obliterate differences, only to soften them— 
or better, to understand them as deriving from a common ground. He couched 
his basic point abstractly in what he called the logic of prajfia-intuition (soku-hi): 
“A is not-A, therefore A is A.”13 In present context, tariki is not-tariki, there­
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fore it is tariki. That is, only to the extent that we succeed in seeing tariki as not 
set off from what we normally assume is other-than-tariki, in this case, jiriki, 
do we understand tariki’s true nature. We can sec, I think, why Thomas Merton 
wrote in his Introduction to The Shen Hui Records'. “The religious genius of the 
Far East, China and Japan, is the only one that has so far achieved . . . perfect 
resolution of any possible conflict between action and contemplation” (italics 
in original).
n. Is God Without or Within?
This question is closely related to the preceding one, for if God is outside us 
his power will come to us as tariki, whereas if he is the deepest stratum of our 
selves we will sense that power as our own. There is a difference in angle, 
however. The jiriki/tariki question asked from whence we experience God’s 
power as coming, whereas the present one asks what the God/man relation 
is. Both questions are posed in spatial terms, but space of course is not the issue. 
In the realm of the spirit space figures only symbolically.16 The question is not 
whether God is literally located inside or outside the human frame, but whether 
in last analysis the two must be distinguished.
** See Chapter Two, "Symbolism of Space," in my Forgotten Truth: The Primordial 
Tradition (New York: Harper & Row, 1976).
With rare exceptions—Dionysius the Areopagite and Meister Eckhart come 
at once to mind—Western theology insists that the distinction must hold to 
the end. The Christian treatise I happen to have read most recently is one I 
have already cited in a footnote. Titled Prayer, it is by a Jesuit theologian, Hans 
Urs von Balthasar, and I shall quote him as representative on the point at hand.
Father Balthasar recognizes, of course, that as the ground of our being, God 
is not set off from us in the excluding way in which an apple, say, is demarcated 
from an orange or from the bowl that contains them both.
The Son ... is no finite Thou marked off in contradistinction to us, 
but the origin and ground in which our whole being with all its roots is 
fixed, from which it draws its sustenance and derives all the best cha­
racteristic features.... “I in them and thou in me” (John xvni. 23). 
The person who contemplates has not to strive laboriously to enter a 
region wholly alien to him. ... In a profound, supernatural sense, he 
enters into himself. (God’s) eternal word of love ... is more interior 
to me than I to myself (pp. 49-50).
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This shows emphatically that the West’s God/man distinction is no simple- 
minded one. God “is no mere Other; he is the eternal Thou, who spans the 
dreary barrier between me and the not-me” (ibid., 54). Yet even in a formula­
tion as discerning as this, a distinction remains. “The pure soul is, indeed, a 
mirror, a resplendent image and symbol of the eternal Spirit but only a mirror” 
(ibid., 207).
In Shin, of course, the distinction likewise figures; if anything, it is more 
pronounced than in the Christian formulation I have just quoted, and for rank 
and file Shinnists it is doubtless final. For Dr. Suzuki, however, it is only 
provisional. The “ego is called by Shin philosophers h’,” he points out (CH'', 
159), as contrasted with ho which “is ‘Dharma,’ ‘Reality,*  'Amida,*  and ‘the 
other-power’. This opposition appears to our intellect as contradiction” (Kyogyb- 
shinshS, 284; hereafter cited as A), but at the deepest level of spiritual awareness 
the contradiction is resolved. “[In] ‘Namu-amida-butsu*  . . . the oneness 
of it and hb is embodied: ‘Namu’ is ki and ‘amida-butsu’ is hb. . . . The hb is 
the absolute self while the ki is the relative, conceptual self. Shin teaches that the 
hb and ki are one” (CIV, 160, 156). To those who might object that this conclu­
sion is more Dr. Suzuki’s than Shin’s, we have already admitted that not all 
Shinnists would accept it But this does not make it idiosyncratic, or even 
confined to Shin esoterism. Myokonin are a class of Shin devotees whose 
simplicity and near-illiteracy align them closely to the common people, and one 
of the best loved modern myokonin concluded exactly as Dr. Suzuki docs. 
“JW and hb are one” (from a song by Asahara Saichi, quoted in CW, 161).
As Zen begins where Shin thus ends—in Zen’s words, with the not-twonesi 
of small mind and Big Mind—“there is... a difference metaphysically between 
Zen and Shin in this respect. While Shin [normally] regards ... the Other 
[as] standing in opposition to ‘I*,  Zen merges the ‘I’ in the Other” (CHr, 97). 
This difference gives us a provisional line-up of Zen and Suzuki’s Shin on one 
side and Christianity and conventional Shin on the other. But if we have 
watched Shin span this divide, reflection shows that Zen does so as well. With 
all its efforts directed toward having us realize experientially that we are the 
Buddha-nature, Zen stands emphatically on the “God-within” side of the 
divide that is now before us. But the Self which it equates with the Buddha- 
nature is obviously not the self we normally experience—in Shin vocabulary, 
it is not the ki. So in both schools we find distinction and indistinction. In Zen 
and Suzuki’s Shin the distinction is between the apparent self and the Self that 
is finally real; in conventional Shin the distinction is between karmic mortals
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and Amida—the clement of indistinction in both camps we have already noted. 
Here as before we must add that these similarities do not conform Shin to Zen. 
Differences remain, but they are now traceable to differences in spiritual per­
sonality-types rather than views of reality.17 They are negotiable.
17 Shinran’s formulation of this point is as follows; “What Buddhas teach and what 
Buddhas tell us to practice are as infinitely varied as the sands, or as particles of dust. 
Beings arc . . . varied in disposition and mentality, .. . and the karmicsituation in which 
Buddhas find them are ... so varied that they arc to be instructed in the most varied 
ways” (AT, 98).
Dr. Suzuki applies this point to Zen and Shin in these words: “Zen is richer in intel­
lectual elements and Shin in the affective or emotional” (CW, 97). Converted into Hindu­
ism’s most precise of all spiritual charactcroIogics, this says that Zen is jnanic, Shin 
bhaktic. On pages 62, 64, and 73 of Collected Writings Dr. Suzuki explicitly correlates 
Shin with bhakti, but in keeping with his statement in Kt 260, that “Zen . . . is . . the 
practice of mental concentration, in which the reasoning process of the intellect is cut 
short,” he might better have characterized Zen as meditative or concentrative, which 
would link it more to raja than to jfiana yoga.
in. Is God Personal or Transpersonal?
/Ml of the dichotomies I am considering are sharper in the West than in Asia, 
which makes it not surprising that it is from an Asian source that I think I 
find clues for tempering them. In the West the personhood (personal nature) of 
God is axiomatic. The Christian Creeds proclaim God in three persons, and 
when pronouns are used to refer to the deity, personal ones arc almost always 
employed. But whereas in the West, use of the pronoun “it” for God is likely to 
bring charges of pantheism, Dr. Suzuki alternates between “he” and “it” 
freely; casually, we might almost say. Most of the time he uses “he” to refer to 
Shin’s Amida Buddha and “it” for Zen’s Buddha-nature, Big Mind, and 
Dharmakaya, but this usage is not inflexible.
God is the most worthful of all realities—about this there can be no two 
opinions. As persons are the most worthful realities we tangibly encounter, it is 
logical that the most worthful object we can conceive should be an extension in 
their direction. Take all that makes persons the noblest of God’s creatures that 
we know concretely—their sensitivity, their responsiveness, their capacity to 
love and create. Purge these human virtues of their attendant all-too-human 
limitations, elevate the cleansed remainder as far as mind can reach, and the
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object in which these exalted perfections converge is God. The God that 
emerges from this approach is personal or he is nothing.
The approach is so plausible that we have to work a bit to realize that there 
are some who cavil. What these objectors fear most obviously is the slough of 
anthropomorphism into which personalism can readily slide. The concept 
“person” originates with a human referent: can it move beyond that referent 
without carrying finite human baggage with it? We need not join the Greek 
satirists and imagine Being Itself itching or The Nature of Things tippling in 
the wine bowl at off moments—we have said that the concept of a personal God 
begins by screening out human impurities. The problem is that even human 
virtues fall so short of God’s that it seems presumptuous to class the latter under 
human labels. Knowing is an almost miraculous capacity, but compared with 
the divine omniscience human knowing is almost nothing. A knowing that 
comprehends everything—the entire past and future in a single incandescent 
sweep—is so removed from the way persons know that we may well wonder if 
the term “personal” should be applied to it
This is the first consideration that can cause minds to balk at the idea of a 
personal God. A second runs deeper. Persons are social creatures. As social 
psychologists like Charles Cooley and George Herbert Mead gave their lives to 
demonstrating, they are created by a dynamic context of exchanges, an unend­
ing series of give-and-take interactions. Feral children who are deprived of 
this interpersonal exchange do not grow up to be persons; their minds and 
“personalities” are arrested at a sub-human level. All this adds up to the fact 
that personal implies interpersonal. And the concept “interpersonal” encounters 
difficulties when applied to God because it violates the divine unity or sim­
plicity, for in Father Balthasar’s words, “in . . . the . . . Infinite . . . there is 
no . . . quantitative multiplicity” (p. 210). If there is nothing outside God; if 
(to take the case most immediately at hand) I myself am not outside him, he 
being “more interior to me than I to myself” (ibid., 51), where, for God, is the 
other on which the notion of interpersonal builds ? What it would be like to be a 
person and have nothing outside myself to work on and deal with, eludes me 
completely.
In the face of these objections Western theologians continue to insist on the 
personhood of God because, I should like to suggest, the West’s alternative to 
"person” has become “thing”—a brute, inanimate object such as a stone or 
magnetic field which, having no sentience whatever, is emphatically Shuman. 
But this, as I say, is a Western opposition. Buber’s dichotomy between I-Thou
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and I-it relations was bom of a tradition which, on the trail of modem science, 
progressively “disqualified” nature until apart from man—or animals in 
general if you think Descartes went too far—nature came to be seen as housing 
primary qualities only.1* A Japanese Martin Buber is scarcely conceivable, 
and despite Japan’s admiration for German philosophers I have not heard 
that he has much of a following there. For to repeat, the “it”—the spectre of 
“dead matter” deriving from what Whitehead called “the fallacy of misplaced 
concretion”—has never haunted the Orient. A Japanese visitor once presented 
me with a kakemono (that is, a vertically hanging scroll) which has become one 
of my most treasured possessions. I have less than an amateur’s knowledge of 
Chinese, but in this case I could make out that its first three characters
lg Since writing these words I have come in quick succession upon two disparate 
sources that point up how aberrant this modem Western notion is. Describing the out­
look of pre-civilized man, Stanley Diamond writes: “Personalism ... is the most his­
torically significant feature of primitive life and extends from the family outward to the 
society at large and ultimately to nature itself. It seems to underlie all other distinctive 
qualities of primitive thought and behavior. Primitive people live in a personal, cor­
porate world, a world that tends to be a ‘thou’ to the subject ‘I’ rather than an ‘it’ 
impinging upon an objectively separate and divided self. Consciousness for the primitive 
is the most common condition in the universe” (The Search for the Primtioe, New Bruns­
wick, N. J.: Transaction Books, 1974, p. 145).
Having all but forgotten that, far from being confined to primitives, this intuition 
informed all civilizations including our own, until a mere 200 years ago ours was the first 
to lose our grip on it, we will do well to read Philip Sherrard’s reminder: “The Platonic 
hierarchy of forms is a structure of participations stretching from the highest super- 
sensual realities down to those of the visible world. It is this structure of participations 
which constitutes the great golden chain of being, that unbroken connection between 
the highest and lowest levels of life. Tn this structure, there is nothing that is not animate, 
nothing that is mere dead matter. All is endowed with being, all—even the least particle— 
belongs to a living, transmuting whole, each thing is a revelation of the indwelling crea­
tive spirit. It was not until the end of the eighteenth century, with Lavoisier and his 
peers and followers, that the scientific intelligence in Europe became so blunted and 
whittled down that it lost its sense of the mysterious numinosity of all things, reduced 
everything either to phenomenon (fact) or to mathematical hypothesis (or, in less polite 
language, fiction), and conceived the physical world to be no more than so much 
inanimate dead matter whose chemical changes were mechanical processes based upon 
the so-called law of the conservation of mass” (Sophia Perrnnis, n, I, Spring 1976), pp. 42- 
43-
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added up to “Heaven and earth have .. . or “The entire universe is embued 
with. . . .” When I asked the meaning of the remaining character ft, my 
friend groped for an English equivalent and finally resorted to the German 
“gefuhl” (feeling, sentiment, consciousness).
In Part Four of The Kyogishinsho Shinran writes: “Because the Dharma­
nature is tranquillity (nirvana), the Dharmakaya is formless. Because it is form­
less, it assumes every possible form. Therefore, the Dharmakaya provides itself 
with form.” To which Dr. Suzuki adds: “Now the Dharmakaya is a person” 
(K, 190). Thus casually is the question of God's personhood handled in Shin. 
God is personal in that, like us, he is aware. Infinitely so; in the Hindu ternary 
sal-chil-inanda he is chit. At the same time he is not personal insofar as that term 
implies human limitations (anthropomorphism) or relational!ty, for as we have 
seen, in the final analysis there is nothing outside God for him to relate to. 
One is free to come down on either side of the ledger he pleases.
iv. Is God Substance or Process?
Like the preceding question this one has a Western ring, for it is in the West 
that Process Theology has emerged as a movement to challenge the substance 
theology of classical Christianity. Not having been implicated in this con­
troversy which has grown lively only since his death, Dr. Suzuki doesnot address 
it directly, but here again I find his writings suggestive.
They bear importantly if only indirectly on the process/substance debate 
because of their Buddhist base.19 The doctrine of anicca—impermanence, or in 
Whitehead’s phrase, “perpetual perishing”—is fundamental in Buddhism; so 
fundamental in early Buddhism that it gives the flavor of process, flow, and 
becoming to its entire perspective. But we know that Buddhism did not stop 
with its earliest formulations—Theravada may have, but not Buddhism as a 
19 Process philosophy derives basically from Whitehead, and "for some years scholars 
have been suggesting that Whitehead and Buddhism have much in common” (John 
Cobb and Jay McDaniel in their introduction to the proceedings of the conference on 
"Mahayana Buddhism and Whitehead” that was held at the University of Hawaii in 
November, 1974)—a section of those proceedings appear in Philosophy East and West, 
xxv, 4 (October 1975). More recently Professor Cobb has written that "Whitehead’s . . . 
creativity... is remarkably like the ancient Buddhist dependent co-origination" 
(“Buddhist Emptiness and the Christian God,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 
xlv, 1, March 1977, p. 16).
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whole. Whitehead’s challenge to the substance thinking of mainline Western 
philosophy has marked parallels with Gautama’s challenge to Vedantic sub- 
stantialism,20 but in the Asian instance 2500 years have afforded time for the 
pendulum to return closer to the mean, the Buddhist, middle-way-balancc 
between the two extremes. Specifically, there has been time for the Midhyamika 
to appear.
To this Madhyamika I shall return almost immediately, but to conclude the 
present brief section the point is a simple one. As a Buddhist Dr. Suzuki harks 
back continuously to amcca, the fleeting skandhas, and the dharmas’ never- 
ending flow. All the while, as a Mah&yana Buddhist, he freely interposes 
terms that refer to things that at some level of existence have every appearance 
of being substances. “Dharma,” "dharmakaya,” “bodhisattva,” “Amida,” 
“Ai” and “A3”—all these are nouns. To describe things that behave sometimes 
like waves and sometimes like particles physicists have coined the word “wav- 
icle.” Lacking a philosophical counterpart to this word we can imagine Dr. 
Suzuki invoking again his “logic of soku-fn": “Substance is not-substance, there­
fore it is substance.” Translated into the present context: “Only if we see sub­
stance as not set off against things other than itself—most importantly here, 
process—do we understand its true character as substance.” And vice versa.
Conclusion
I have indicated some ways in which Dr. Suzuki’s two posthumous volumes 
on Shin Buddhism have helped me toward kneading four theological opposites 
into dialectical negotiables. If I ask in conclusion why they do so, the answer 
that comes to me runs something like this:
Buddhism issued from the Buddha’s enlightenment. That enlightenment 
pierced to a depth of truth so far beyond the normal that it defied verbal 
description and accentuated the “two levels of truth” thesis, intimated in the 
Brhaddranyaka and Isa Upanifads, to an extent that made it pivotal for all sub-
J0 Dr. Suzuki describes the latter challenge as follows: “The Indians . . . indulged 
too much in the static side. [Their] way of thinking is to be immersed in . . . sameness. 
[Following the Buddha’s lead,] the Chinese practical mind sees [that] the ‘becoming*  
aspect is not neglected. . . . The Buddha’s way of thinking is that . . . sameness is . .. 
the infinite series of consciousness-waves” {The Field of Zen, London: The Buddhist 
Society, 1969, pp. 19, 75).
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sequent Indian thought.31 * This thesis throws all conceptualizations into a 
supporting role. As ufldyas—provisional means, instrumental devices—they can 
be important, even decisively important inasmuch as, skilfully employed, they 
can awaken enlightenment. But not being enlightenment itself, they are 
second-order truths and therefore always relative—for Buddhism Nagarjuna 
and the Madhyamika worked this out exhaustively and probably definitively. 
In Frithjof Schuon’s image, these second-order truths are "celestial mirages" 
designed to catch as in a golden net the greatest possible number of creatures 
plunged in ignorance, suffering, and darkness.33 But they arc not absolute. They 
are negotiable.
31 See Mervyn Sprung (cd), The Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedanta
(Holland: D. Reidel Publishing, 1973).
33 In the Tracks of Buddhism (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1968), p. 198.
As for first-order truth, in what is perhaps the most widely read text in 
modem Japan, Tannishd, this truth is located in the nembutsu whose "reason is 
where it transcends all reasonings, because it is inexpressible, indefinable and 
inconceivable" (CPF, 211). If truth of this order seems to our Western minds to 
be slippery if not amorphous, this may be because of the degree to which our 
minds have been structured by Aristotle, it being, as Dr. Suzuki says, "im­
possible in the world of dualistic logic for beings to have a connection to the highest 
reality without the intervention of some intermediate condition," be it a con­
ceptual representation or a symbol of some other sort. “Yet Japanese spiritual­
ity,” he adds, “accomplishes this connection directly, without any difficulty” 
{Japanese Spirituality, 21, italics added). It is as if the Japanese could accept 
without surprise and as a matter of course that the passengers on the Warrimoo 
were cheated out of their New Year’s Eve party because December 31 dropped 
out of their lives forever. It had vanished in the Void.
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